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Racial Steering: The Real Estate
Broker and Title VIII
Eight years ago, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders warned that America was rapidly moving toward two separate
societies, one white and one black.' Residential segregation, docu-
mented by the Commission, continues to be nearly universal. 2 Segre-
gated housing patterns cannot be entirely explained by the economic
disparities between black and white buyers3 or by individual choice.4
1. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 225 (1968).
2. Id. at 118-20. See Hearings on Equal Educational Opportunity Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. v, at 2727-32
(1970) (statement of Karl E. Taueber) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings], reaffirming
the findings of K. TAUEBER 9- A. TAUEBER, NEGROES IN CITIES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1965).
Between 1970 and 1974, black residents in inner city areas increased by 800,000 (to 22%
of the total population of those areas), while net white emigration from the central
cities was 4.3 million. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN POPULATION:
1974 AND 1970, at 4, 8 (Ser. P-23, No. 55, 1975). See generally Long, How the Racial
Composition of Cities Changes, 51 LAND ECON. 258 (1975). Although black population in
the suburbs increased by more than ! million, blacks remained only five percent of the
total suburban population in 1974 (the same percentage as in 1960 and 1970). BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE
BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1974, Table 5 at 14, Table 6 at 15 (Ser. P-23,
No. 54, 1975). For a detailed description of minority migration and urban residential
segregation, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER
BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 119-36 (1975) [hereinafter cited as EQUAL OP-
PORTUNITY IN HOUSING].
The growing black population in the suburbs does not necessarily indicate an in-
crease in the number of integrated communities. See Connolly, Black Movement into
the Suburbs: Suburbs Doubling Their Black Populations During the 1960s, 9 URs. A''.Q. 91, 97-98 (1973) (black expansion "fundamentally attributable to the physical ex-
pansion of inner-city ghettos into contiguous areas" as well as to transformation of
predominantly black suburban areas into ghettos); Farley, The Changing Distribution of
Negroes Within Metropolitan Areas: The Emergence of Black Suburbs, 75 AM. J. SOC.
512, 526-27 (1970) (while black emigration slows the growth of black population in the
cities, it does not alter the fact of metropolitan racial segregation).
3. See J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 57-58(1975); NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING (NCDH), JoBs AND
HOUSING: A STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR RACIAL MINORITIES
IN THE SUBURBAN AREAS OF THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION 41 (Interim Report,
March 1970); Cottingham, Black Income and Metropolitan Residential Dispersion, 10
URB. AFF. Q. 273, 292 (1975); Hermalin & Farley, The Potential for Residential Integra-
tion in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Busing Controversy, 38 AM. Soc. REV.
595, 601 (1973).
4. See J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 58-61; 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at
2730 (statement of Karl E. Taueber).
The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII
Such housing patterns are, to a significant extent, the result of the
practices of the real estate brokerage industry.5
The real estate broker has traditionally performed a "gatekeeping"
function, directing white buyers to predominantly white areas and
minority buyers to minority or interracial areas.6 This practice is
called racial steering.7 While certain forms of steering have been held
to violate Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,8 courts have yet
to articulate fully the reasoning behind those holdings or to consider
the entire range of steering practices which may come within the
statutory prohibition. This Note analyzes racial steering practices and
concludes that virtually all are unlawful under Title VIII. It argues
that Title VIII's most far-reaching prohibition against steering is its
"colorblind" standard, which forbids real estate brokers from treating
customers differently on the basis of race.
I. The Practice of Racial Steering
Racial steering is a generic term for a variety of longstanding and
ubiquitous practices by which a real estate broker directs buyers
toward or away from particular houses or neighborhoods according to
the buyer's race.9 These practices may be divided into two broad
5. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 16
(1974). See NCDH, supra note 3, at 80; NATIONAL NEIGHBORS, RACIAL STEERING: THE
DUAL HOUSING MARKET AND MULTIRACIAL NEIGHBORHOODS 3 (1973). But ef. E. MILLS,
URBAN ECONOMICS 168 (1972) ("mo blame housing segregation on realtors and mortgage
lenders is like blaming bad news on the journalist.")
6. See S. Palmer, The Role of the Real Estate Agent in the Structuring of Residential
Areas: A Study in Social Control 56-57 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Yale University
Library); Barresi, The Role of the Real Estate Agent in Residential Location, I Soc.
Focus, Summer 1968, at 59, 60.
7. For definitions of racial steering, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, REALTORS
GUIDE TO PRACTICE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REAL-
TORS GUIDE]; NATIONAL NEIGHBORS, supra note 5, at 10; Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp.
1028, 1047-48 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
This Note deals only with racial steering. However, the analysis applies as well to Title
VIII liability of brokers for steering based on sex, religion, or ethnicity because discrimi-
nation on these grounds is also prohibited by Title VIII. See p. 813 infra. While ref-
erences to ethnic and religious steering exist in the literature, e.g., S. Palmer, supra note
6, at 110-13, 121-27, no suits have been brought challenging such practices.
8. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975); United States v. Robbins,
P-H EQ. Opp. Hous. f 13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
This Note focuses on the legality of steering under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (Supp. IV 1974). For a discussion of liability for steering
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), see note 23 infra.
9. For discussions of the nature and extent of racial steering, see NATIONAL NEIGHBORS,
supra note 5, at 20-24; H. OPENSHAW, RACE AND RESIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY
VALUES IN TP.ANSITIONAL AREAS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, 1960-1971, at 56 (Georgia State Uni-
versity, School of Business Administration, Monograph No. 53, 1973); UNrrED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOWER-INCOMIE FAMILIES: A REPORT
ON THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC IMPACT OF THE SECTION 235 PROGRAM 60-61 (1971); Saltman,
809
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 808, 1976
classes of conduct: (1) advising customers to purchase homes in partic-
ular neighborhoods on the basis of race;' 0 and (2) failing, on the basis
of race, to show, or to inform buyers of, homes that meet their
specifications.".
Brokers steer for a variety of reasons. Sellers may instruct brokers
Implementing Open Housing Laws Through Social Action, 11 J. APP. BEHAV. Sct. 39,
43-45 (1975); Hearings on the Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal
Opportunity in Housing Before the Subcomm. on Civil Rights Oversight of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1971-72).
The nationwide scope of the steering problem is suggested by the number of jurisdic-
tions in which actions complaining of steering practices have been filed. See Fair Hous.
Council of Bergen County v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Civ. No.
76-418 (D.N.J., filed Mar. 8, 1976); Center for Advocacy, Research and Planning, Inc. v.
Eaton, Civ. No. 75-117 (D. Conn., filed June 12, 1975); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp.
1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Heights Community Congress v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., P-H
Eq. Opp. Hous. 13,702 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Village of Park Forest v. Fairfax Realty, P-H
EQ. Opp. Hous. 1 13,699 (N.D. Ill. 1975); TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co., 377 F. Supp. 111
(C.D. Cal. 1974), affd in part and rev'd in part, Civ. No. 74-2147 (9th Cir., Mar. 23, 1976);
United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 516
F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va.
1974); United States v. Robbins, P-H EQ. Opps. Hous. ff 13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974); United
States v. Real Estate One, Inc., Civ. No. 39743 (E.D. Mich., filed Mar. 21, 1973).
The Department of Justice and defendant real estate agencies have also entered
numerous consent decrees. United States v. Corbin, Civ. No. AC-75-160 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 9,
1976); United States v. Ashcraft, Civ. No. S-75-57C (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 1975); United
States v. Stan Weber & Assocs., Civ. No. 73-512 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 1975); United States v.
Salling, Civ. No. 74-752-LTL (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 1974); United States v. Barrows & Wallace
Co., Civ. No. 74-143 (D. Conn. July 25, 1974); United States v. Chess Realty Co., Civ. No.
73-2205 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1974); United States v. Mabry, Civ. No. 73J-150-R (S.D. Miss.
Mar. 11, 1974); United States v. Lackey, Civ. No. 73-648-Civ-T-K (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 1974);
United States v. Grempler Realty, P-H EQ. Opp. Hous. ff 18,002 (D. Md. 1972).
10. Such advice may take the form of disparaging interracial neighborhoods to white
customers, while telling black customers that they would not be "comfortable" living in
predominantly white neighborhoods. See Findings of Fact at 15, United States v. Real
Estate One, Inc., Civ. No. 39743 (E.D. Mich., entered Apr. 26, 1976); Zuch v. Hussey, 394
F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Barresi, supra note 6, at 69. Brokers may also
discourage buyers from looking for homes in certain neighborhoods by explicitly men-
tioning the neighborhood's racial composition. See Zuch v. Hussey, supra at 1037, 1039.
Racial information may also be communicated to the buyer through code words or
phrases-for example, by characterizing neighborhoods as "busted," "changing," "deterio-
rating," or "not nice." See, e.g., id. at 1036.
11. For examples of practices by which brokers attempt to deny black buyers the op-
portunity to purchase homes in white areas, see Findings of Fact at 10-15, United States
v. Real Estate One, Inc., Civ. No. 39743 (E.D. Mich., entered Apr. 26, 1976); United States
v. Robbins, P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. ff 13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974); United States v. Northside
Realty Assocs'., Inc., P-H Eq. Opps. Hous. ff 13,552 (N.D. Ga. 1971); R. HELPER, RACIAL
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 42-43 (1969); Bogen & Falcon, The Use
of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. Rev. 59, 62-63 (1974); Barresi, supra
note 6, at 69; S. Palmer, supra note 6, at 133-42.
Steering may also take the more subtle form of offering for the buyer's consideration
only homes in neighborhoods composed predominantly of persons of the buyer's race.
See NATIONAL NEIGHBORS, supra note 5, at 20 (results of Cleveland, Ohio study); pp. 817-18
infra. This conduct, often based on a broker's desire to please his customers, is part of
the broker's customary practice of matching buyers with neighborhoods in which the
broker believes they would feel comfortable. For a description of this customary practice,
see Barresi, supra note 6, at 62-63; S. Palmer, supra note 6, at 12-16, 65-66, 180.
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not to show their homes to members of a particular race.1 2 Where
the broker steers on his own initiative, he tends to justify the practice
by relying on traditional industry values. Until 1950, the Code of
Ethics of the real estate brokerage industry3 encouraged racial steer-
ing.14 The National Association of Realtors (NAR) and its constituent
local boards have in the past been vocal opponents of fair housing
legislation.";
While the industry has recently adopted an official policy of non-
discrimination,' 6 this change in industry norm is not likely to eliminate
steering. One sociologist has identified a pervasive "broker ideology"
which fosters the practice of racial steering.' 7 Brokers generally assume
12. One New Haven realtor cited pressure by white sellers to maintain segregated
neighborhoods as a major factor in racial steering. Interview with Albert Poirier, New
Haven, Conn. (Nov. 19, 1974) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
13. The major trade organization in the real estate industry is the National Associa-
tion of Realtors (NAR) (called the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB)
until 1973). NAR represents over 1500 local boards and 84,000 individual members. Hear-
ings on S. 1358, S. 2114, S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 135S]. Black brokers, originally excluded from NAREB, formed
the National Association of Real Estate Brokers in 1948. See Brown, Access to Housing:
The Role of the Real Estate Industry, 48 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 66, 70 (1972).
14. Until 1950, Article 34 of NAREB's Code of Ethics stated:
A realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a
character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any in-
dividual whose presence would clearly be detrimental to property values in that
neighborhood.
R. HELPER, supra note 11, at 201 (emphasis added). See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING,
supra note 2, at 4. Although reference to race was deleted from the Code, apparently for
public relations reasons, the change was one of appearance and not effect. See J. DENTON,
APARTHEID-AMERICAN STYLE 48 (1967); R. HELPER, supra note 11, at 201; Hearings on S.
1358, supra note 13, at 201. Helper found that the official policies of national and local
broker organizations contribute directly to the beliefs and practices of the broker. R.
HELPER, supra note 11, at 261.
15. See J. DENTON, supra note 14, at 2-19; Brown, supra note 13, at 71-72; Hearings on
S. 1358, supra note 13, at 337 (statement of Alan L. Emlen, chairman, Realtors Washing-
ton Comm. of NAREB). For the position of the black broker organization (the National
Association of Real Estate Brokers), see id. at 185 (statement of Q.V. Williamson strongly
supporting open housing legislation).
After the passage of Title VIII, NAREB interpreted the Act narrowly. It informed its
members that the law did not require that a black customer requesting general informa-
tion about available homes be told of houses the broker knew to be available in white
neighborhoods. Grayson & Wedel, Open Housing: How to Get Around the Law, 158
NEw REPUBLIC, June 22, 1968, at 15 (citing NAREB memorandum).
16. The NAR recommends that all members implement its Code for Equal Op-
portunity "so that a unified, positive policy may prevail among [member brokers] and
so that we may set a good example in this sensitive field." REALTORS GUIDE, supra note
7, at 3. The Code for Equal Opportunity essentially repeats the prohibitions of Title VIII
and includes specific applications of the general principle that brokers "have the
responsibility to offer equal service to all clients and prospects without regard to race."
Id. at 5.
17. A perceptive analysis of the broker's attitudes and values is developed in R.
HELPER, supra note 11, at 143-54. The author identifies five core beliefs of what she
terms the "exclusion ideology" shared by many brokers: (1) most whites do not want
black neighbors; (2) property values decline as black residents enter white neighborhoods;
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that white home owners and home buyers desire segregated communi-
ties.' 8 Accordingly, a broker may steer white buyers toward white
neighborhoods in the belief that he is satisfying their preferences, and
steer black buyers away from such areas in order to preserve the values
and standards of the white areas in which he operates.' 9 If the broker
assumes that buyers prefer to live with persons of their own race, he
may not view his practices as discriminatory or their segregative ef-
fects as pernicious. Rather, both the practices and effects may be seen
as consistent with the segregative tendencies of the society at large.
Steering may also be good business. It pays well when used in a
"blockbusting" strategy, where a broker, in order to frighten white
owners into selling their homes, represents that blacks are purchasing
homes in the neighborhood.20 The broker then guides black buyers
toward, and white buyers away from, the transitional neighborhood.
In predominantly white neighborhoods that are not undergoing racial
change, the broker may steer to avoid the loss of patronage that might
result if he showed or sold homes to blacks.2' Finally, racial steering
is attractive to brokers on grounds of simple business efficiency. The
quickest and surest sales can be made by satisfying buyer preferences,
which brokers assume to be for neighborhoods inhabited by members
of the buyer's own race.22
II. Statutory Liability23
A. Section 3604(a): Making Housing Available
Section 3604(a) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
provides that it shall be unlawful
(3) integrated neighborhoods eventually become resegregated; (4) whites are hurt
financially and socially by sales to blacks in white areas; and (5) selling to blacks in
white areas is an unethical business practice.
18. Id. at 140.
19. See id. at 117-20. Such conduct is not limited to racial steering. Brokers may also
seek to preserve communities on the basis of class, ethnicity, or religion. See Barresi,
supra note 6, at 60; S. Palmer, supra note 6, at 12.
20. Blockbusting is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970). For a general discussion
of the methods of blockbusting, see Note, Blockbusting, 59 Gao. L.J. 170 (1970); Note,
Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM.
J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 538 (1971).
21. See R. HELPER, supra note 11, at 94, 140. Cf. S. Palmer, supra note 6, at 66 (brokers
fear consequences of introducing members of different social groups into homogeneous
neighborhoods). But cf. Barresi, supra note 6, at 64 (brokers surveyed indicate little
outside pressure and believe their views are consistent with, but not determined by,
community values).
22. NATIONAL NEIGHBORS, supra note 5, at 12.
23. This section discusses broker liability for steering under Title VIII. However,
racial steering may also violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which provides: "All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .. . to
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[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.24
While the phrase "otherwise make unavailable" has been read broadly
by the courts, 2a it has not yet been construed with any precision. The
*.. purchase . .. real and personal property." Several steering cases have alleged claims
under the section. Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973) (broker
who falsely told black buyer that no homes were available in white areas violated both
Title VIII and § 1982; court did not state reasoning for finding § 1982 violation); Heights
Community Congress v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. f" 13,702 (N.D. Ohio
1975) (standing allowed under Title VIII; § 1982 issue not reached); Village of Park
Forest v. Fairfax, P-H EQ. Opt. Hous. F 13,699 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (standing found under
Title VIII and denied under § 1982); TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 377 F. Supp. IlI (C.D.
Cal. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Civ. No. 74-2147, slip op. at 2 nA (9th Cir.
Mar. 23, 1976) (standing denied under § 1982).
Enacted as part of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, § 1982 lay dormant until the Supreme
Court's holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), that § 1982 pro-
hibits private as well as public discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. The
Court was careful to distinguish the section from the recently-enacted Title VIII, stating
that "§ 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law." Id. at 413. The Court con-
trasted the two statutes in language which seemed to leave open the possibility that
§ 1982 could be applied to brokerage services: "[§ 1982] does not deal specifically with
discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or
rental of a dwelling." Id. at 413 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Whether § 1982 in
fact applies to brokerage services depends upon the meaning of the section's guarantee
of "the same right" to purchase property. The phrase clearly prohibits owners from
refusing to sell their homes to a willing buyer on the basis of the buyer's race. See
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra. It also reaches brokers who aid owners seeking to
sell only to persons of a particular race. See Ford v. Wisconsin Real Estate Examination
Bd., 48 Wis. 2d 91, 179 N.W.2d 786 (1970); see also Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d
336 (7th Cir. 1972) (§ 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in real estate transactions by
sellers and brokers; but no violation found).
A more difficult case arises when the broker steers on his own initiative. In this
situation, unlike that in which the owner refuses to sell, the purchase is not impossible.
See pp. 813-14 infra. However, it could be argued that the broker may so impair the
buyer's ability to find and purchase available housing that the buyer is effectively denied
the right to purchase the property. It could also be argued that § 1982's guarantee of the
"same right" to purchase property prohibits any limitation, based on the buyer's race,
of the opportunity to purchase housing. Cf. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d
324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974) ("the same right" to purchase property
includes ability of buyers to purchase similar homes in black and white neighborhoods
at similar prices and on similar terms and conditions). But cf. Love v. DeCarlo Homes,
Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973) (finding no liability under
§ 1982 on facts similar to those in Clark).
For other arguments that § 1982 applies to steering, see Note, Housing and Section
1982: The Advisability of Extending the Statutory Mandate Beyond Acts of Traditional
Discrimination, 1975 DuKE L.J. 781, 799-800 (1975) (steering by sellers of real estate); cf.
Morris & Powe, Constitutional and Statutory Rights to Open Housing, 44 WAsH. L. REv.
1, 83 (1968) ("Although section 1982 does not explicitly cover discriminatory terms and
conditions or discriminatory misrepresentations of non-availability, the section would be
practically nullified if it were not construed to prohibit these practices.")
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added).
25. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified
on other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (language "appears to be as broad as Con-
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phrase must be interpreted in its statutory context and with reference
to the more specifically defined terms it accompanies.2 6 Hence, any
practice is illegal under the last clause of § 3604(a) if it makes housing
unavailable in the same manner as a refusal to sell or negotiate. When
a broker refuses to negotiate, he impedes, but does not prevent, the
buyer's purchase of a dwelling. Since the buyer canoseek the services
of another broker or negotiate directly with the seller, a refusal to
negotiate simply raises an obstacle between the buyer and available
homes he might be interested in purchasing. Reading the subsection
as limited to acts that make purchase impossible would immunize real
estate brokers from liability under § 3604(a). If this analysis is applied
to the last clause of the subsection, the phrase "otherwise make un-
available" should be construed to prohibit conduct that impedes or
obstructs a willing buyer from purchasing, or considering the purchase
of, an available home that meets his specifications.2 7
At least one court has held that broker advice that discourages
white buyers from purchasing in black areas violates § 3604(a). 28 It is
gress could have made it"). However, a 1966 version of the Fair Housing Act, which failed
to pass the Senate, used even broader language. H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403
(a)(7), 112 CONG. REC. 22622 (1966): "[It is unlawful] [t]o engage in any act or practice,
the purpose of which is to limit or restrict the availability of housing to any person or
group of persons because of race .... Senator Dirksen called this provision "the world
with a fence around it." Id.
26. Ejusdem generis is an accepted principle of statutory construction. See 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 332(b) (1953).
27. See United States v. Long, P-H Eq. Op. Hous. f 13,631, at 14,090 (D.S.C. 1974)
(Section 3604(a) "reaches every practice which has the effect of making housing more
difficult to obtain on account of race.")
A broker cannot impede the purchase of housing if the buyer has no intention of
making a purchase. Consequently, it is difficult to see how "testers"-persons who pose
as purchasers in order to monitor broker compliance with fair housing legislation-can
have housing made unavailable to them. But see Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.
Mich. 1975) (housing made unavailable to testers in violation of § 3604(a)). For an
argument that testers may sue under § 3604(b), see note 48 infra.
The first clause of the § 3604(a) provides that it is unlawful to refuse to sell or rent
"after the making of a bona fide offer." P. 813 supra. The bona fide offer require.
ment applies only to the prohibition against refusals to sell or rent. See United States v.
Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified on other grounds,
509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); 114 CONG. REc. 5515 (1968) (sponsor of amendment
adding bona fide offer requirement stated that "the latter part of paragraph (a) is not
conditioned upon a bona fide offer, because the amendment as offered concludes with
the word 'or' rather than 'and' "). Interpreting the subsection to require a bona fide
interest in Purchasing before housing can be made unavailable does not read the bona
fide offer requirement into the remainder of the subsection. Indeed, persons with a
bona fide interest in purchasing may be unable to make a bona fide offer precisely
because housing has been made unavailable to them. Therefore the limitation of the
bona fide offer requirement to refusals to sell or rent is not inconsistent with the view
that testers without a bona fide interest in purchasing a home do not have a cause of
action under the remainder of the subsection.
28. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975); cf. United States v. Long,
P-H Eq. Opp. Hous. ff 13,631 (D.S.C. 1974) (owner-developer's policy of discouraging
blacks from living in white areas held to violate § 3604(a)).
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hard to see how such conduct, while undoubtedly a steering practice,
makes housing unavailable within the meaning of the subsection.
Even though discouragement or encouragement by a broker may in-
fluence a buyer's choice, the broker neither refuses to show homes nor
creates an obstacle to a buyer's desired purchase. The buyer is free to
accept or reject the broker's advice. As long as the broker makes clear
that he is willing to show the customer all available housing that
meets the buyer's specifications, he does not make housing unavail-
able to a buyer who merely follows his advice.
If brokers may provide advice on the basis of race without violating
§ 3604(a), it would seem to follow that they may also lawfully provide
factual information. Where the broker conveys accurate information
without an explicit or implicit value judgment,29 it is difficult to
Zuch is the only case to discuss at length Title VIII liability for steering. The court
found that brokers were attempting to accelerate the racial transition of a neighborhood
in Detroit by combining steering with blockbusting. (For a discussion of the use of
steering as part of a blockbusting strategy, see p. 812 supra.) Faced with evidence of
bad faith manipulation of buyers and sellers, the court held that brokers illegally "made
housing unavailable" by suggesting to white buyers that they not live in transitional
neighborhoods. The court stated:
Unlawful steering or channeling of a prospective buyer is the use of a word or
phrase or action by a real estate broker or salesperson which is intended to influence
the choice of a prospective property buyer on a racial basis. . . .Where choice in-
fluencing factors such as race are not eliminated, freedom of choice in the purchase
of real estate becomes a fantasy. . . . It is the freedom of choice for the purchaser
which the Fair Housing Act protects ....
Accordingly, any action by a real estate agent which in any way impedes, delays,
or discourages on a racial basis a prospective home buyer from purchasing housing
is unlawful....
... [W]hen a real estate agent actively undertakes an effort to influence the choice
of a prospective home buyer on a racial basis .. . the agent . . .discourages the
prospective home buyer from purchasing a home in a particular area.
394 F. Supp. at 1047, 1048 (citations omitted). The court did not explain how influencing
the choice of a prospective buyer "makes housing unavailable" within the terms of
§ 3604(a). However, the court clearly held that "warnings" by brokers about the racial
composition of an area which discourage white buyers from purchasing in that area
violate the subsection.
For a consent decree prohibiting this form of racial steering, see United States v.
Lackey, Civ. No. 73-648-Civ-T-K, at 16 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 1974), which states that no
information with respect to the racial composition of a particular area
shall be used to encourage any prospect to live in a neighborhood predominantly
occupied by persons of his own race, and no prospect shall be warned or advised:
(a) that he will not or may not be welcome in an area because of racial opposition in
the neighborhood; or (b) that he should avoid purchasing or renting a home in a
neighborhood because of the racial composition of the area.
29. Analytically, the difference between advice and information is clear enough:
advice attempts to influence the buyer's choice by changing or molding his preferences,
while provision of information merely helps the buyer to make his own choice according
to his existing preferences. In practice, however, the line between the two may be more
difficult to draw. The manner in which information is transmitted to the buyer-with
a raised eyebrow or a particular tone of voice-may transform it into advice. Consider,
for example, such statements as: "Yes, there are homes available in that neighborhood,
but it is 50%o black, you know."
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term such conduct steering and harder still to characterize it as mak-
ing housing unavailable. And if brokers may volunteer racial informa-
tion, a fortiori they may respond to buyer questions concerning the
racial composition of the neighborhood. 30
Although § 3604(a) does not appear to prohibit a broker from ad-
vising buyers where to purchase3' or from informing them of the racial
30. Cf. United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352, 361 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd without
opinion, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) ("agent's good faith response to an inquiry made
by the homeowner regarding the race of a prospective buyer of his home is not per se
violative [of § 3604(e)] where ... the agent's answer is not couched in such a fashion as
to prey upon the fears of the homeowner"). But cf. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028,
1051 n.11 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("defendants clearly went beyond any reasonable discussion
of race which might be lawfully permissible" under § 3604(a); but court reserved judg-
ment on question whether race can ever be discussed in real estate transaction).
In its consent decrees the Justice Department has allowed brokers to answer ques-
tions by buyers about the racial composition of a neighborhood. See, e.g., Consent Decree
at 5, United States v. Mabry, Civ. No. 73-J-150-R (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 1974) ("Information
with respect to the racial composition of a particular area . . . shall only be made
available in response to a specific question concerning such racial composition.")
Similarly, NAR advises its members that "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, questions
[requesting racial information] . . .may be answered factually with a disclaimer of any
intention to show or offer homes on a racial basis." REALTORS GUIDE, supra note 7, at 22.
One commentator has suggested that if a legislature decides that a buyer has no right
to choose a home on the basis of race, it could forbid a broker from answering questions
about changes in the racial composition of a neighborhood. An Anti-Blockbusting Ordi-
nance, 7 HARV. J. LEGis. 402, 412 (1970). But such a rule would deprive the buyer of the
broker's special knowledge and experience. See Note, supra note 23, at 800. A ban on
answering questions would also raise serious First Amendment issues. See note 31 infra;
cf. United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969) (First Amendment
problem raised if § 3604(e)'s prohibition against blockbusting interpreted to reach honest
answers to questions by homeowners).
31. Other subsections of § 3604 may reach such conduct. If the broker encourages
members of one race to live in a particular neighborhood and discourages members of
another race as to the same neighborhood, he would be liable under § 3604(b). See p. 819
infra.
In addition, one court has held that encouraging buyers to choose a home on the
basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)
(Supp. IV 1974), which makes it unlawful
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.
(Emphasis added). United States v. Long, P-H EQ. Opp. Hous. 1 13.631, at 14,091 (D.S.C.
1974) ("Defendant's admitted policy of attempting to talk blacks out of living in white
buildings and areas, and of encouraging them to live in black or transitional areas or
complexes violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).")
While the subsection is most clearly aimed at discriminatory advertising, see, e.g.,
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972), limiting
the reach of the subsection solely to advertisements would render the word "statement"
surplusage. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 633, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane) (Wright &
Wilkey, J.J., respectively, concurring) (six judges agreeing that § 3604(c) prohibits the
District of Columbia Recorder of Deeds from recording restrictive covenants); see United
States v. Hunter, supra at 210 ("each phrase in a statute must, if possible, be given
effect"). Thus, the subsection could be interpreted to prohibit, in addition to advertise.
ments, other statements indicating a racial preference in connection with the sale or
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composition of various neighborhoods, 32 the subsection clearly bars
practices that prevent buyers, on the basis of their race, from seeing
homes that meet their specifications. Such practices may consist of
affirmative misrepresentations as to the availability of a home33 or
deliberate failures by the broker to show a buyer homes in which the
buyer might reasonably be interested.34 Also illegal is more subtle
conduct that does not evidence any overt refusal to show particular
homes and that may stem from good faith as well as bad faith motives.
For example, the broker may only show or suggest homes to buyers in
neighborhoods composed predominantly of members of the buyer's
race. This practice, which may be termed "matching steering," has
never been held illegal and has only recently been challenged in
rental of a dwelling. See United States v. L &- H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 580 (S.D.
Fla. 1976) (statements by managing agent of apartment building that tenants could not
entertain black guests violated § 3604(c)). This construction is narrower than the one
adopted by the court in Mayers v. Ridley, supra, where the person prohibited from act-
ing was not himself engaged in the sale of a dwelling, but would clearly reach statements
by brokers such as "the seller does not wish to sell to blacks." The subsection would also
seem to prohibit statements of encouragement or discouragement based on race (such as
advice to a white buyer not to purchase homes in black areas), because such statements
indicate a preference that the area be reserved for buyers of a particular race.
This interpretation may raise First Amendment problems. The Supreme Court has
recently held that the First Amendment does not permit the government to "com-
pletely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely
lawful activity," even though the information takes the form of commercial advertising.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W.
4686, 4693 (U.S. May 24, 1976) (Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising
prescription drug prices violates the First Amendment). The court distinguished Hunter
on the ground that there the transaction proposed by the advertisement was illegal. Id.
at 4693. The First Amendment may now limit the reach of § 3604(c) to indications of
racial preference in a commercial context which promote or encourage acts otherwise
illegal under the statute, such as making housing unavailable or discriminating in the
provision of brokerage services. Subsection (c) then would add nothing to the prohibi-
tion on advice already contained in § 3604(b). See pp. 818-21 infra.
32. However, the broker would violate § 3604(b) if he provided different information
to black and white buyers. See pp. 819-20 infra.
33. See United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399, 401 (E.D. Va. 1974).
Such misrepresentations are explicitly prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (Supp. IV 1974),
which provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o represent to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection,
sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available."
34. See United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974). The
broker may similarly frustrate purchases by showing black buyers only those homes in
white areas that do not meet their specifications (thereby making unavailable homes in
white areas that do meet their specifications) or by failing to inform buyers of homes that
become available after the initial meeting with the buyer, but before the buyer has
purchased a home. For allegations of such conduct, see Complaint at 16, 17, Fair Hous.
Council of Bergen County v. Eastern County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., Civ. No.
76-418 (D.N.J., filed Mar. 8, 1976). Cf. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., P-H
EQ. Opp. Hous. r, 13,552 (N.D. Ga. 1971), remanded for further proceedings, 474 F.2d
1164 (5th Cir. 1973) (white broker enjoined from referring black purchasers to black
brokerage agencies).
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court. 35 Matching steering is within the prohibition of § 3604(a) be-
cause it eliminates an entire class of homes from a class of buyers on
the basis of race. It effectively makes housing unavailable in the
avoided neighborhoods, without the buyer being aware that those
homes are on the market. The broker should be liable even if he does
not intend to deny the buyer available housing. The subsection does
not require a showing of intent; it refers only to prohibited acts.,3
B. Section 3604(b): Discriminatory Provision of Services and the
Colorblind Standard
Although courts and litigators have focused on § 3604(a) as a
statutory prohibition of racial steering, § 3604(b) appears to provide a
broader ban.37 Section 3604(b) provides that it shall be unlawful
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.38
No court has construed the phrase "in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith," nor is it explained in the legisla-
tive history of Title VIII. By interpreting the phrase to refer to
services in connection with the sale of a dwelling,39 courts can reach
35. See Complaint at 16, Fair Housing Council of Bergen County v. Eastern Bergen
County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., Civ. No. 76-418 (D.N.J., filed Mar. 8, 1976); Com-
plaint at 2, United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., Civ. No. 39743 (E.D. Mich., filed Mar.
21, 1973).
36. For cases holding that an intent to discriminate need not be demonstrated to
establish a violation of Title VIII, see United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438,
443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); United States v. Hughes Memorial
Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D. Va. 1975).
37. Two racial steering cases have alleged a cause of action under subsection (b), but
have not been decided on the merits. TOPIC v. Circle Realty, Inc., Civ. No. 74-2147 (9th
Cir. Mar. 23, 1976) (denying standing to fair housing group); Village of Park Forest v.
Fairfax Realty, P-H EQ. Opp. Hous. f 13,699 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (standing granted under Title
VIII; issue of discrimination not reached). While the court in United States v. Saroff, 377
F. Supp. 352, 365 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), afrd without opinion, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975),
referred to an allegation under § 3604(b) and found no violation, the Justice Depart-
ment's complaint made no mention of the subsection. Complaint at 4, id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added).
39. This interpretation is supported by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
413 (1968). The Court contrasted § 3604(b) with 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), which "does not
deal specifically with discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
tion with the sale or rental of a dwelling" (footnote omitted). But see Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Justice
Harlan apparently interpreted this phrase in § 3604(b) to mean services and facilities
connected with a dwelling. He cited the phrase to show that the Court could rely on
Title VIII, and need not expand § 1982, to reach a refusal of a community park to
allow a member to assign his membership to a black man to whom he leased his house.
(Curiously, however, Harlan also quoted the statement from Jones cited above.)
The use of the terms "services" and "facilities" in other sections of Title VIII suggests
that the phrase "services or facilities" in § 3604(b) refers to those in connection with the
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the discriminatory provision of real estate brokerage services. 40
Racial discrimination is defined as treating similarly situated persons
differently on the basis of their race.41 Since racial steering consists of
channeling buyers to different neighborhoods according to race, nearly
all forms of racial steering are discriminatory and therefore prohibited°
by § 3604(b).42 The subsection clearly covers blatant discrimination,
where brokers intentionally hinder members of one race and help
members of another race to enter particular neighborhoods. Further-
more, when a broker advises whites and blacks seeking similar hous-
ing to live in different neighborhoods, he discriminates in the pro-
vision of brokerage services (even if he does not make housing un-
available in violation of § 3604(a)). Matching steering is also barred,
because white and black customers, differing only in race, are shown
separate classes of homes. While matching steering would not be es-
tablished if a buyer did not see available homes because he chose
the first home shown to him, a broker may not arrange the order in
which he shows homes on the basis of the buyer's race.
Section 3604(b)'s prohibition against discriminatory provision of
brokerage services requires that a real estate agent not differentiate
between buyers on the basis of race. As such, it establishes a legal
standard of "colorblindness." 43 While such a standard may not reach
sale or rental of a dwelling. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1970) (exempting from Title VIII
any single-family house sold "without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities
or the sales or rental services of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman"); id. § 3606
(Supp. IV 1974) (making it unlawful to deny any person access to any "service, organiza-
tion, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings").
40. Although 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (Supp. IV 1974) is entitled "Discrimination in the
provision of brokerage services," it does not deal with provision of services by brokers to
buyers, but rather with access to, or membership and participation in, brokerage organiza-
tions (such as multiple listing services).
41. See, e.g., Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1115 (1973).
42. Section 3604(b) expressly prohibits discrimination by brokers in the "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges" of a sale. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Steering practices barred by § 3604(b) are
indirectly linked to this explicit prohibition. Steering helps to maintain separate housing
markets for black and white buyers; and in markets restricted to black purchasers, houses
are often sold at inflated prices and with less advantageous financing arrangements. For
discussions of these "dual housing markets," see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501
F.2d 324, 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc.,
482 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973); Contract Buyers League
v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. I11. 1969), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Baker v.
F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); J. KAIN 9- J.
QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 56-90.
43. As NAR advises its members: "[E]ach broker and agent should analyze his own
procedures and ask: 'Are we doing that for everybody?"' REALTORS GUIDE, supra note 7,
at 23.
Senator Mondale stated during the Senate debate on Title VIII that "what this bill
does is to make race irrelevant, which is the foundation of this country." 114 CoNG.
REa. 5643 (1968). A colorblind standard is implicit in consent decrees recently entered into
by the Department of Justice and real estate agencies. See, e.g., United States v. Lackey,
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every conceivable form of racial steering,4 4 it sets a minimum standard
of conduct by which the broker must abide in order to comply with
Title VIII.
The colorblind standard sweeps more broadly than current Title
VIII law and reaches steering practices other than those heretofore
tested in court.45 It prevents the broker, at his own option, from
selecting housing on the basis of race to show the customer. The
broker must not assume racial preferences on the part of buyers.40 He
must be prepared to show all the homes within his operating area that
meet the buyer's specifications, to provide the same information about
particular neighborhoods to black and white buyers,47 and to show
Civ. No. 73-648, at 15 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 1974), providing in part:
3. Whenever a prospect makes inquiry regarding a home or homes, the defendant
shall make the prospect aware of the existence of all available homes of the same
character and of the desired price range, without regard to the location of such
homes, and will make available to the prospect an opportunity to ascertain the in-
formation with respect to all such homes.
4. The agents shall suggest and show homes and neighborhoods to all prospects with-
out regard to race or color, and shall provide each black and each white prospect
with full and accurate non-racial information regarding the desirability of all homes
and neighborhoods suggested or shown by him.
5. No agent shall limit the homes shown or offered to be shown to any prospect or
allocate an unreasonable proportion of such homes shown or offered to be shown,
to areas in which a majority of the residents are of the prospect's own race, or in
which there is a transition to such condition.
44. It is possible that brokers could treat black and white buyers alike and still steer
them. For instance, a broker could tell every buyer he serves: "I advise you to live with
members of your own race; these areas are predominantly black, and these white." There
is no evidence that such conduct is common among brokers. Informational statements
describing the racial composition of an area are also beyond the reach of the subsection
if delivered in a similar fashion for white and black buyers.
45. The court in Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975). defined
"unlawful steering" as "the use of a word or phrase or action by a real estate broker or
salesperson which is intended to influence the choice of a prospective property buyer on
a racial basis." The Zuch rule is deficient both in including advice as unlawful steering
under § 3604(a), see pp. 814-15 supra, and more importantly in failing to include other
forms of steering which are illegal under § 3604(b). The court appears to require a
showing of intent to influence buyer choice-an element that may either be lacking or
very difficult to prove in a case of matching steering. Under the colorblind standard of
§ 3604(b), different treatment of black and white buyers (or testers) would be a violation
of Title VIII even absent a showing of intent. The standard would also impose liability
for various broker practices which courts have loosely characterized as making housing
unavailable. Hence, the court in United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., P-H EQ.
Opp. Hous. ff 13,552, at 13,721 (N.D. Ga. 1971), remanded for further proceedings, 474
F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1973), after finding that defendant had treated a black buyer "in a
different manner than he would have treated white customers," could simply have
found liability under § 3604(b). Instead it held, with no analysis, that the conduct
violated § 3604(a).
46. The colorblind standard would not forbid the broker from telling buyers that he
can act upon their specific instructions as to the type of neighborhoods they would like
to see. But cf. REALTORs GusDE, supra note 7, at 22 (NAR's advice to the broker that
racial preferences not be honored).
47. In requiring the broker to provide similar information and advice to black and
white buyers, § 3604(b) regulates the broker's speech. The subsection presents no serious
First Amendment problem, however, because it affects only speech which is an integral
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homes in a similar manner to all buyers. If adopted by the courts, the
colorblind standard will encourage the use of "testers" to monitor
broker compliance with Title VIII. A broker who practices steering
could be recognized by the different treatment accorded black and
white persons who pose as buyers and request similar homes.48
III. Legislative History49
The conclusion that racial steering violates Title VIII is consistent
with the liberal interpretation 0 accorded by courts in giving effect to
part of the brokerage services rendered to the buyer. The reasoning of one court in up-
holding § 3604(e)'s blockbusting prohibition applies with equal force to subsection (b):
"the statute is one regulating conduct, and . . . any inhibiting effect it may have on
speech is justified by the Government's interest in protecting its citizens from dis-
criminatory housing practices and is not violative of the First Amendment." United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 474
F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973); accord, United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga.
1971). Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (upholding state statute prohibiting
courthouse picketing as "a valid law dealing with conduct subject to regulation so as to
vindicate important interests of society," and stating that "the fact that free speech is
intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection"); United
States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (conviction for attempt to interfere
with the administration of tax laws does not violate First Amendment: "speech is not
protected when it is the very vehicle of a crime itself"). This conclusion is not altered by
recent Supreme Court decisions extending substantial First Amendment protection to
commercial advertising. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4686 (U.S. May 26, 1976) (invalidating state law that prohibited
advertising of drug prices by pharmacists); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10,
829 (1975) (Court reversed conviction for advertising out-of-state abortion referral service,
but stated that its holding was not inconsistent with the result in Bob Lawrence, supra);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm., 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (dictum
that commercial advertisements for legal transactions might receive some First Amendment
protection). As opposed to advertising which proposes a commercial transaction, the
speech regulated by § 3604(b) is a part of the transaction itself. Moreover, § 3604(b) does
not limit what the broker can tell the buyer; it merely requires the broker to say the same
thing to all similarly situated buyers.
48. While testers may be unable to establish a cause of action under § 3604(a), see
note 27 supra, they should have no problem under § 3604(b) if they are treated dif-
ferently by a broker on the basis of race.
Testers are important in fair housing litigation because bona fide buyers may decide
not to sue. By the time a suit could be resolved, a buyer is likely to have found a home
elsewhere. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1973), in
which the defendant real estate agent told two black buyers that they could probably
force a sale by bringing a suit but that "he would tie the case up in court for so long
they would no longer want the house."
The value of testers as witnesses has been recognized by the courts. See United States
v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 647 n.3, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified on other
grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1974). In United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732,
734 (W.D. Wis. 1975), the court held that a Wisconsin statute prohibiting the use of
testers to gather evidence was unconstitutional under the supremacy clause as an
"obstacle to the accomplishment of the principal objective of Congress in passing the
Fair Housing Act."
49. Since Title VIII was first introduced on the floor of the Senate (as an amend-
ment to H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)), 114 CONG. R e. 2270 (1968), there are
no committee reports dealing with the statute. Reliance must therefore be placed on
hearings and debate. For a general discussion of the legislative history, see Dubofsky,
Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
50. See, e.g., Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652-53 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., con-
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Title VIII's stated goal of providing, "within Constitutional limita-
tions, fair housing throughout the United States."' 1
The basic purpose behind Title VIII was to encourage the dispersal
of the urban ghettos that had experienced rioting and disorder52 in
the summers of 1965 through 1968. To achieve this purpose Congress
sought to put an end to discriminatory practices that tended to exclude
blacks from white suburbs. 53 Proponents of the fair housing legislation
sought to attain three specific goals by ending racial discrimination in
housing: preventing the humiliation inflicted by unequal treatment
based on race, ensuring freedom of choice in housing, and promoting
residential integration.54 Federal courts enforcing Title VIII have
sought to effectuate these purposes. 5
curring); United States v. Realty Dev. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 776, 781-82 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
Since the statute creates only civil penalties for violations, the strict construction gen-
erally afforded criminal statutes is not appropriate.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. IV 1974).
52. See NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DiSORDERS, supra note 1, at 19-61.
53. Senator Mondale summarized the purpose of Title VIII when he introduced his
fair housing bill, amendment 524 to H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). which be-
came Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968: "[F]air housing legislation is a basic
keystone to any solution of our present urban crisis.... Declining tax base, poor sanita-
tion, loss of jobs, inadequate educational opportunity, and urban squalor will persist as
long as discrimination forces millions to live in the rotting cores of central cities." 114
CONG REc. 2274 (1968). This statement echoed the words of the proponents of the fair
housing title of the 1966 civil rights bill, H.R. 14765, Title IV, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 21857 (1966) (Sen. Hart). The 1966 fair housing bill, which died
in a Senate filibuster, was quite similar to the subsequently enacted Title VIII. For a
history of the earlier bill, see 112 CONG. REC. 21854-55 (1966).
While the supporters of the 1968 legislation understood that only a small number of
ghetto dwellers would be able to afford property in suburban areas, they believed that
the fair housing title was important as an expression of the nation's concern for the
well-being of its black minority. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1358, supra note 13, at 2 (Sen.
Mondale). Compare the minority views of Representative Whitener on the 1966 legisla-
tion, asserting that federal fair housing laws would not solve the problems of the ghetto
and would only raise false hopes in American minorities. H.R. REP. 1678, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1966).
54. See 114 CONG. REc. 5643 (1968) (Sen. Mondale's statement that Title VIII "re-
moves the opportunity to insult and discriminate against a fellow American because of
his color"); id. at 3426 (Sen. Mansfield's statement that Title VIII would give every
American "the opportunity to freely choose the house which he desires"); id. at 2283,
2525 (references to the goal of integration by Sen. Brooke).
55. Prevention of dignitary harm caused by housing discrimination was implicitly
acknowledged as one rationale for Title VIII when its constitutionality was upheld as a
"valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate
badges and incidents of slavery." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir,
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); accord, United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370
F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified on other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1975). Another way in which courts have recognized this statutory purpose is the award
of damages in Title VIII suits to compensate plaintiffs for "humiliation" caused by
defendants' discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d
1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974).
Courts have also recognized Title VIII's goals of freedom of choice, Zuch v. Hussey,
394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975), and integration, Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante, residents of an apartment complex
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Racial steering frustrates the achievement of these statutory pur-
poses. When a broker steers, his discriminatory practices insult the
dignity of black buyers and residents of black neighborhoods.56 Steer-
ing also abridges freedom of choice, because the broker excludes from
the buyer's consideration a particular class of houses that meets the
buyer's specifications. The practice helps to maintain all-white neigh-
borhoods and encourages the resegregation of interracial areas by
preventing buyers from seeing homes that they would have purchased
had they been given the opportunity.57 Moreover, the local broker
often enjoys a position of influence over a buyer new to the com-
munity, and his suggestion as to where the buyer should live can
shape the buyer's preferences.58 Hence, the broker's assumption that
brought suit against the owner of the complex on the ground that his discriminatory
policies excluded blacks from renting. Citing Senator Mondale's statement that "the
reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos 'by truly integrated and balanced
living patterns,'" id. at 211, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs' allegations that they
had been denied important benefits of living in an integrated apartment complex were
sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 210.
56. Some residents of white neighborhoods may suffer dignitary harm from broker
practices that exclude black purchasers. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972), discussed in note 55 supra.
57. The view that some buyers, if not steered, would purchase homes in areas com-
posed predominantly of persons of a different race is supported by recent sociological
studies that indicate that factors such as "the quality and convenience of housing and
neighborhood services take precedence over racial prejudice in housing decisions."
SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS: PAPERS ON RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS IN
CHOICE OF HOUSING 19 (A. Hawley & V. Rock eds., 1973).
While it might be argued that the statute should be interpreted to permit brokers to
steer in order to foster integration (for example, by allowing brokers to match black buyers
with white neighborhoods), the argument must be rejected. To permit steering which
fosters integration would require overriding the language of the statute, which contains no
exemption for activities that promote integration. Such an interpretation would also
conflict with the statutory goal of freedom of choice, because steering in any form limits
the buyer's range of choices. Finally, steering which appears to promote integration
could serve as a cloak for blockbusting. See p. 812 supra. Brokers who are attempting
to change the racial composition of an area from predominantly white to black would be
able to claim that they had steered black families into the area for purposes of integra-
tion.
The Second Circuit's decision in Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d
Cir. 1973), does not mandate a different conclusion. In Otero, plaintiffs claimed that the
policy of the New York Housing Authority to ensure racial balance in a housing project
violated § 3604 and the Authority's own eligibility regulation. The court held that the
Authority had an affirmative duty to promote integration that overrode its regulation
and § 3604. This duty to integrate was based on 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1970), which
requires that federally-assisted housing programs be administered "in a manner affirma-
tively to further the policies" of Title VIII. The statute imposes no such duty on real
estate brokers. Moreover, the court recognized that use of a "benign quota" could be
justified only in situations where a colorblind standard "would almost surely lead to
eventual destruction of . . . racial integration .... ." 484 F.2d at 1136. As this Note
argues, the imposition of a colorblind standard on the broker would further, rather than
hinder, integration.
58. See Barresi, supra note 6, at 59.
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buyers prefer to live with members of their own race may become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
IV. Costs to the Broker
Liability for racial steering will alter substantially the ordinary
business practices of the broker and may inflict significant costs on
his operations. To comply with Title VIII, the broker would not be
able to limit the customer's choice of housing to neighborhoods with
a particular racial composition. Thus he might have to show homes
in several different neighborhoods. However, this cost may not be
substantial, because the broker need not show more homes than is his
custom. Compliance with Title VIII will also prevent the broker from
excluding black buyers from white areas. Since residents of white areas
may prefer to list their homes with brokers who will steer black
buyers away from their neighborhoods, brokers who comply with the
law are likely to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to brokers
who do not comply. Vigorous enforcement of the statute59 could
prevent any disadvantage to law-abiding brokers, but might lead
sellers who wish to discriminate to do without brokerage services al-
together. However, sellers as well as brokers are prohibited from dis-
criminating in the sale of housing; 60 therefore, the incentive to avoid
brokered transactions would exist primarily in those situations where
a home owner believes he can locate an "acceptable" buyer without
having to refuse to sell to others on the basis of race.
There will also be enforcement costs to the broker. If found liable
under Title VIII, the broker may be subject to an injunction, com-
pensatory damages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages up to $1,000.61
Even if the broker is not found to have violated the statute, the test-
59. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has been particularly critical of
Title VIII enforcement by HUD, but has noted that the Justice Department has used
its limited resources efficiently. See EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING, supra note 2, at
174-75; II UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT EFFoRT-1974, at 30-47, 329-33 (1974); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 445-46, 493 (1970). However, as the Supreme
Court noted in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972), "com-
plaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the
Act."
60. Although 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1970) exempts from the coverage of Title VIII
certain sales by owners of single-family dwellings (such as those made without the aid
of a broker and without violating § 3604(c)'s prohibition of discriminatory advertising),
homeowners who discriminate in the sale of their homes would be liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); note 23
supra.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (Supp. IV 1974). In suits brought by the Attorney General of
the United States, relief is limited to an injunction. Id. § 3613 (1970).
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ing procedures themselves may inflict significant costs. Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 62 and its progeny have broadened the
scope of standing under Title VIII,63 and it seems likely that "testing"
activities of local fair housing groups will increase. Therefore brokers
may have to devote a significant amount of time to buyers who have no
interest in purchasing a home. However, this cost should be incurred
only as long as brokers continue to discriminate. Burdens on the
broker may also be mitigated to the extent that he is able to pass on
increased costs (through higher commission rates) to sellers and, ul-
timately, to buyers.
Insofar as liability for racial steering inflicts costs on brokers, it must
be assumed that Congress determined that any such burdens are
justified by the benefits of eliminating housing discrimination.64 While
preventing racial steering may not stop individual buyers from making
housing choices based on race, it will help remove the real estate in-
dustry from its longstanding role in establishing and maintaining
segregated living patterns. This is no more than what Congress in 1968
attempted to do.
62. 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (white tenants granted standing to challenge landlord's rental
practices that excluded blacks).
63. See Heights Community Congress v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., P-H EQ. Opp. Hous.
13,702 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (standing for fair housing organization alleging steering); Village
of Park Forest v. Fairfax Realty, P-H EQ. Opp. Hous. 1 13,699 (N.D. II. 1975) (standing for
municipal corporations, fair housing organizations, and residents of community alleging
steering). But see TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co., No. 74-2147 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 1976), ajf'g
in part and rev'g in part, 377 F. Supp. Ill (C.D. Cal. 1974). In TOPIC a fair housing group
sought to enjoin the steering practices of defendant brokers. The plaintiffs sued under 42
U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970), alleging injuries similar to those alleged under § 3610 by the plain-
tiffs held to have standing under Trafficante; they claimed that they had been deprived
of the benefits of living in an interracial community and had suffered embarrassment and
economic loss from being stigmatized as residents of a white ghetto. TOPIC, supra, slip
op. at 2. The Ninth Circuit denied standing, holding that a suit under § 3612, as opposed
to § 3610, was available only to direct victims of discrimination: the section "does not
authorize lawsuits to vindicate the rights of third parties." Id. at 3. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in TOPIC hinders direct access to the courts by fair housing groups. However,
such groups may still file a complaint under § 3610 with the Secretary of HUD; if the
Secretary is unable to obtain voluntary compliance, they may bring an action in a
federal court. Moreover, individual testers who are members of fair housing groups could
sue under § 3612. See note 48 supra.
64. One commentator has observed that, rather than characterizing the costs of anti-
discrimination laws as insubstantial, "it seems more realistic to recognize [these costs]
and to assume that the justification for incurring these costs consists of the non-
quantifiable value attached to the aims of the law." Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employ-
ment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 254-55 (1971).
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